

On Value-Attributions: Semantics and Beyond

Isidora Stojanovic

Institut Jean-Nicod – CNRS – ENS

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Abstract

This paper is driven by the idea that the contextualism-relativism debate regarding the semantics of value-attributions turns upon certain extra-semantic assumptions that are unwarranted. One is the assumption that the many-place predicate of truth, deployed by compositional semantics, cannot be directly appealed to in theorizing about people's assessments of truth value, but must be supplemented (if not replaced) by a different truth-predicate, obtained through certain "postsemantic" principles. Another is the assumption that semantics assigns to sentences not only truth values (as a function of various parameters, such as contexts, worlds and times), but also *semantic contents*, and that what context-sensitive expressions contribute to content are certain contextually determined elements. My first aim in this paper will be to show how the two assumptions have shaped two ways of understanding the debate between contextualism and relativism, as regards value-attributions. My second aim will be to show that both assumptions belong outside semantics, and are moreover questionable.

I Introduction.

contextualism vs. relativism – a distinction without a difference?

In recent years, philosophy of language and semantics have witnessed a vibrant debate between contextualist and relativist approaches to various areas of discourse; in particular, predicates of personal taste and, more generally, evaluative predicates and the languages of aesthetics and ethics. If the debate may appear to have reached

an impasse, that is because all the parties in the debate seem to presuppose certain principles regarding truth and content. The aim of my paper is to argue that the presupposed assumptions are unwarranted. There are two main assumptions that may both be traced back to David Kaplan's pioneering work on indexicals (1989). The first assumption concerns the definition of the truth predicate, and the second, the notion of semantic content. But before articulating the two assumptions, and explaining the role that they occupy in the debate, a question arises as to what the debate exactly amounts, and what demarcates relativist semantic frameworks from contextualist ones. As we shall see shortly, there does not seem to be a unique answer to this question. Rather, there are several issues at stake, each of which provides a different way of drawing the line between contextualism and relativism.

In this introductory section, what I want to do is look at one way of interpreting the relativists' insights, as advanced in the proposals of Kölbel (2002) and, especially, Lasersohn (2005), regarding the semantics of predicates of personal taste, such as 'tasty' and 'delicious'. In those early relativist proposals, it has been held that the behavior of these expressions requires modifying our semantic framework and, specifically, introducing a novel parameter among the circumstances of evaluation, along with the parameters of possible world and time. For our present purposes, we need not worry about the details of the arguments offered in those early proposals. Rather, let us look directly at the frameworks that were put forward as a result of those arguments. I will focus on the one given in Lasersohn (2005), which expands upon the framework of Kaplan (1989), the main novelty being that circumstances of evaluation are no longer world-time pairs, but world-time-judge triples.

Let us use double brackets to denote the semantic interpretation function and, for the sake of simplicity, let us put aside the parameter of a structure of interpretation (which specifies the universe, the sets of worlds and times and the relevant orderings among those, as well as the interpretation of the non-logical vocabulary). Then, if S is a sentence, c a context, w a world, t a time, j a "judge", and f an assignment of values to the variables, the basic format of semantic interpretation will look like this:

$$[[S]](c, w, t, j, f) \in \{\text{True, False}\}$$

In other words, what this "says" is that the semantic interpretation of sentence S gives you a mapping from sequences of the form (c, w, t, j, f) to truth values, hence that sentence S obtains its truth value only with respect to a context, a world, a time,

a judge, and an assignment of values to the variables.

What matters to the present discussion is that those early relativist proposals have also held that the move of introducing a judge parameter was mandatory, and that no alternative semantics could account for the semantic behavior of predicates of personal taste. In particular, the more traditional sort of approaches, on which the dependence of truth value on a judge and his or her taste would be handled by means of an *implicit argument* associated with the predicate, were discarded as inadequate and as incapable of providing an accurate semantic analysis.

It is with that last claim that I took issue in my paper *Talking about Taste* (2007). There, I argued that from the point of view of semantics, relativist frameworks, understood as those that posit a judge parameter in the circumstances of evaluation, and contextualist frameworks, understood as those that treat predicates of personal taste (such as 'tasty') as involving an implicit argument for the "experiencer" or the person whose taste is at issue (hence analyzing what, at surface, is a one-place predicate, 'tasty(x)', as really a two-place predicate, 'tasty-to (x,y)'), were not much more than notational variants.

My argument was based on a formal equivalence result, which it will be enough to summarize here. Let S_c and S_r be respectively sentences in the formal languages of contextualist semantics (i.e. in which *prima facie* one-place predicates like 'tasty' are treated as two-place predicates, viz. 'tasty-to') and of relativist semantics (in which 'tasty' remains a one-place predicate, but its interpretation is a function not only of a world and a time, but of a judge as well). The result proceeds by a definition of a bi-directional translation procedure T between the two formal languages, for which the following holds. Let f_1, f_2 be assignments of values to free variables, and let w be a world of evaluation and u a judge. Then:

- S_r is true with respect to f_1, w and u iff $T(S_r)$ is true with respect to f_1^T and w , where assignment f_1^T is defined in terms of f_1 and u .
- S_c is true with respect to f_2 and w iff $T(S_c)$ is true with respect to f_2, w and u^T , where u^T is a judge value obtained directly from f_2 .

In other words, given a natural language sentence, its contextualist counterpart is predicted to be true for the same distribution of values to the various parameters, as its relativist counterpart. I have furthermore interpreted this equivalence result as suggesting that there is never going to be any properly semantic evidence to cut in

favor of the one account over the other, given that no occurrence of a sentence containing a predicate of taste is going come out true in the one account and false in the other (provided, of course, that the value assigned to the implicit argument on a contextualist analysis be the same as the value chosen for the judge parameter on a relativist analysis).

My results were targeted at the idea that a contextualist account of the variability in truth value associated with a given expression relies on there being an implicit argument associated with the expression, whereas a relativist account relies on there being a corresponding parameter in the circumstances of evaluation, along with the world (and the time) of evaluation. That this is at least one possible way of drawing a line of division between the more traditional contextualist frameworks and the more avant-garde relativist frameworks may be seen from this passage from Kölbel's *Introduction* to the volume *Relative Truth*:

"The focus of this book is whether there are novel truth-determining factors, such as standards of taste and states of knowledge, and how exactly such a determination relation should be construed. The two basic rival options are as follows. First, the view that the sentences in question merely exhibit a hitherto unnoticed contextual dependence analogous to indexicality (...) Secondly the view that the sentences in question express non-standard propositions that exhibit a relativity of truth analogous to that postulated, for example, by temporalists (...). I shall call views of the second kind "relativist". Relativism is therefore the view that some propositions vary in their truth-value with some parameter(s) over and above the possible world parameter." (2008: 4)

However, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems more and more clear that this is not the *only* possible line of division. In the following three sections, I shall discuss another line of division, the one favored by such relativists as John MacFarlane. In the last section, I will address more specifically Lasersohn's reply to my equivalence results, and thereby consider yet another possible line of division.

II Assessment–sensitivity: from future contingents to value–attributions

While the distinction discussed in the previous section remains relevant to the question of how to best account for variability in truth value, the idea that *that* is the contextualism–relativism distinction has been challenged. John MacFarlane (2009) holds that merely introducing some novel parameter among the circumstances of evaluation does not suffice to make a framework "relativist" (with respect to that parameter). In this section, I would like to go back to the very source of MacFarlane's reluctance to view circumstance–dependence as a hallmark of relativism, which has to do with future contingents. Understanding MacFarlane's move in the case of future contingents will help us understand his motivations for introducing contexts of assessments, which are crucial to his account of value–attributions, too.

Consider a standard temporalist semantic framework, in which the truth value of a sentence is evaluated at a context, a world, and a time of evaluation, and where the usual temporal operators, such as "it was the case" or "it will be the case", are treated as sentential operators whose semantic clauses "shift" the time of evaluation. Thus e.g. 'Past S' is true at (c, w, t) iff there is some time t' earlier than t such that 'S' is true at (c, w, t') , where c is a context, w a world of evaluation, and t and t' are times.

Now, consider some future contingent statement, such as "There will be life on Mars". Assuming that the current state of universe leaves it open whether there will ever be life on Mars, the statement, as of now, is neither true nor false. But suppose that in ten million years, there gets to be life on Mars; then, once life on Mars has been brought about, the very same statement, evaluated retrospectively from that future standpoint, ought to come out true – or so it seems.

These seem to be the two desiderata for views that endorse relativism about time–dependence and that allow for a statement that is neither true nor false to become true in the future. However, a standard temporalist framework does not appear to be "relativist enough" to give satisfaction to both desiderata. It can either account for the idea that the statement lacks a truth value (e.g. taking a branching–time perspective and holding that a statement that gets realized on some branches but not on others is neither true nor false), or else, for the idea that the statement is true (e.g. taking a branching–time perspective but holding that among all the branches, there is some privileged one that corresponds to the actual future, the so–called Thin Red Line). Standard temporalist frameworks do not thus seem to be able, *as such*, to account for the idea that the statement under consideration is devoid of truth value as of now,

but true as of the time that lies 10 million years ahead. In particular, the parameter of time of evaluation does not seem to be able to play the role that one might have thought it could play. For, let t_0 stand for the present time (i.e. year 2012) and let t_{10M} stand for some time that lies 10 million years ahead. One might have thought that the statement "There will be life on Mars", as evaluated at t_0 , is neither true nor false, but as evaluated at t_{10M} (after there has been life on Mars), true. But that won't work, because the future tense operator, on the analysis that has precisely motivated the temporalist treatment, shifts the time of evaluation: evaluated at t_{10M} , the statement is true iff "There is life on Mars" is true at some time *that lies in the future of t_{10M}* . Yet, it may well be the case that by then, there will have been life on Mars but there no longer is (nor will be), thereby making the statement false when evaluated at t_{10M} , contrary to the initial desiderata.

MacFarlane's move in the case of future contingents was to introduce, along with the "old" context-parameter, a new context-parameter, calling the former a context of *utterance* and the latter, a context of *assessment*. It is the former's job to specify the time that serves as a starting point for the future tense operator, and the latter's, to specify the time at which the statement is assessed for its truth value. Hence if a context of assessment takes place ten million years from now (i.e. at t_{10M}), and there has been life on Mars in the meantime, then those "branches" at which there has never been nor will ever be life on Mars are no longer live possibilities, turning the statement from truth-valueless to true.¹

III A second stab at the contextualism-relativism divide: adicity-diminishing definitions of the truth predicate

Although future contingents raise issues of their own, what matters to the present discussion is that MacFarlane saw this proposal, designed for future contingents, as straightforwardly applicable to value-attributions and other phenomena of the same ilk. MacFarlane's account of taste- and, more generally, value-judgments, endorses the sort of relativism that we saw in the introductory section, but takes it one step beyond, by introducing contexts of assessment.

1 This is a simplified presentation of the proposal in MacFarlane (2003). Note that in MacFarlane (2012), he has abandoned his earlier view and has opted for a non-temporalist framework, in which tenses get treated as quantifiers over times.

Consider a framework for the semantics of predicates of taste that is just like the framework that, in sect. I, we called "relativist". The assignment of interpretations, and in particular, of truth values to sentences, will be done, as usual, with respect to a structure of interpretation (which, for simplicity, we shall again set aside), and an assignment of values to the free variables f , as well as with respect to a context c and to circumstances of evaluation, whose parameters include a world w , a time t , a judge j .² Thus the interpretation of any given predicate P will be not only a function of a world and a time, but of a judge as well – though, of course, there are many predicates whose interpretation will remain constant in the judge parameter.

The important point is that the predicate of truth that we end up with is not a monadic but, rather, a many-place predicate. Things are not true *simpliciter*. Rather, sentences are true with respect to a context, a world, a time, a judge, an assignment of values to the variables, and so on. Thus, once again, the basic format of semantic interpretation will be as follows:

$$[[S]](c, w, t, j, f) \in \{\text{True, False}\}$$

This basic format of truth-parametrization will be shared by the "contextualist" as well as "relativist" approaches, as they are about to be defined. However, as we are going to see, the difference will not show up in semantics, i.e. the machinery that maps, in a compositional manner, the sentences of a language to truth values (as a function of the appropriate parameters). Rather, the difference will show up in what MacFarlane (2003, 2012) calls "postsemantics".

Before we pin down the distinction that, in MacFarlane's view, is the one that divides contextualism from relativism, let us observe that there are various ways in which, *qua* theorists, we may toy with the notion of truth that transpires out of this format. For instance, instead of taking the truth value of a sentence to depend on all those parameters that I have listed above, we could (setting once again the structure of interpretation aside) say that it only depends on two: a context and a circumstance of evaluation; and then construe circumstances as sequences comprised of a world, a time, a judge, *and* an assignment of values to the variables. Or we could go even

2 MacFarlane (2012) uses a "gustatory standards" parameter, rather than of a judge parameter.

However, the exact choice of the nature of the parameter used – be it individuals, groups, judges (*qua* individuals endowed with a certain taste), gustatory standards, or directly *tastes*, turns out to be fairly irrelevant to the issue that occupies us here.

further and say that the truth value of a sentence depends on a single parameter, call it a "point of evaluation", but then construe such "points" as sequences consisting of a context plus all the parameters that had been subsumed under a "circumstance of evaluation". And there are many other options. We might want to hold that truth values are not assigned to sentences but to sentence–context pairs, and analogously, that semantic interpretation applies not to sentences but to sentences–in–context.

$$[[S, c]](w, t, j, f) \in \{\text{True}, \text{False}\}.$$

Last but not least (and this will bring us back to our main issue) we may attempt a non–trivial principle that would relate the many–place predicate of truth to a two–place predicate, one that applies to sentences relative to contexts, thus eliminating dependence on the circumstances of evaluation. This "adicity–diminishing" definition of truth may be obtained from the basic semantic format as follows. Let S be any sentence, and c any context:

$$[[S]](c) = \text{True}^* \text{ iff}_{\text{def}} \text{ for all assignments } f, [[S]](c, w^c, t^c, j^c, f) = \text{True},$$

where w^c , t^c and j^c are respectively the world, the time and the judge of context c (or somehow directly supplied by context c). This corresponds to the definition that David Kaplan provides for sentence–truth–in–context.³ I will speak of principle such as this one as "adicity–diminishing", since their main purpose is to reduce the adicity (i.e. the number of argument–slots) of the truth predicate, from many–place to two–place, applying to sentences and contexts.⁴

It is this principle that MacFarlane seems to see as a trademark of contextualism. In MacFarlane's terminology, an "indexical–contextualist" approach to a given class of evaluative expressions treats them as indexicals in disguise (or as containing a "hidden indexical"), while a "nonindexical–contextualist" approach posits a suitable

3 I shall be using "True*" to denote the predicate of truth derived from the semantic predicate of truth. As for the principle, see Kaplan (1989): 547; of course, he does not have a judge parameter in his semantics. In Predelli and Stojanovic (2008), we called the principle "the Classic Reduction".

4 The same sort of principle is sometimes referred to as "diagonalization", echoing a similar move in the work of Stalnaker (1998). Note that, ultimately, one might aim at supplementing this principle with yet another adicity–diminishing principle, in order to reduce "True" to a monadic predicate, applying (arguably) to utterances. Kaplan does that by speaking of "sentence–occurrences" being true, where a sentence occurrence is basically identified with a sentence–context pair.

parameter in the circumstances of evaluation, but crucially, both contextualist approaches would endorse the appropriate adicity–diminishing principle (for each and every parameter in the circumstances of evaluation). By contrast, MacFarlane's view still endorses the principle for the world parameter, as well as for the time parameter,⁵ but not for the judge parameter. Instead, MacFarlane re–deploys in the formal machinery the context of assessment parameter. This parameter is only put at work when it comes to defining sentence truth. Following the spirit of the previous adicity–diminishing principle, MacFarlane offers the following one:

$$[[S]](c_U, c_A) = \text{True} \text{ iff } \quad \text{for all assignments } f,$$

$$[[S]](c_U, w^{c_U}, t^{c_U}, j^{c_A}, f) = \text{True},$$

where w^{c_U} and t^{c_U} are the world and the time of c_U (the context of utterance), but j^{c_A} is the judge of c_A (the context of assessment).⁶ This, too, is an adicity–diminishing principle. The difference, however, is that before we can proceed to eliminate certain argument–places in the basic semantic format for the truth predicate, we first need to introduce a context of assessment. Once this new parameter is available, we can deploy it in our adicity–diminishing principle, thus eliminating dependence on the judge parameter (as well as any other parameter that tracks assessment–sensitivity).

IV The many–place predicate of truth, and the bridging principles

The contextualism–relativism distinction that we are now considering operates, then, at a "postsemantic" level, to use MacFarlane's terminology. The newly introduced parameter of a context of assessment remains idle in the semantic machinery, as it does not appear (or, at least, does not play any role) in any of the semantic clauses of any expression (or, for that matter, any other linguistic constructions). *Ipsa facto*, it stays out of the entire process of compositional computation of truth *conditions*, and only shows up at the point at which one inquires about the sentence's truth *value*.

5 As noted, MacFarlane moves back and forth between a temporalist and an eternalist treatment of time. In (2012): Ch. VII, where he discusses matters of taste, he is using a time parameter.

6 Here is MacFarlane's definition: "A sentence S is true as used at context c_U and assessed from a context c_A iff for all assignments, $[[S]]^{c_U}(w_{c_U}, t_{c_U}, g_{c_A}) = \text{True}$, where w_{c_U} is the world of c_U , t_{c_U} is the time of c_U , and g_{c_A} is the gustatory standard ("taste") of the agent of c_A (that is, the assessor's taste at the time of c_A) (MacFarlane 2012: 175).

Now, MacFarlane's own tacit acknowledgment that the relativist "semantics" that he is offering may be distinguished from contextualist semantics only at the level of postsemantics, already provides due support to my repeatedly made claim that from the viewpoint of semantics, contextualism and relativism are not much more than notational variants. But one might object, understandably, that this would be a cheap victory: merely calling some principle "postsemantic" does not render it irrelevant to properly semantic considerations. So let me devote this section to the question of why some would find it desirable to have any such adicity-diminishing postsemantic principles. The following observation by Max Kölbel goes to the heart of the matter:

It will turn out that semantic theories for natural languages define a three-place truth-predicate applicable to sentences, and that some extra-semantic principles are needed in order to relate this semantic truth-predicate to truth in any pre-theoretic sense.
(2008: 5)

As we have seen, the semantic truth-predicate is not just a three-place predicate, but, on most construals, a many-place predicate. Be that as it may, the important point is that something needs to be said regarding the question of how the truth-predicate deployed in semantics relates to the notion of truth that, rather than being a technical tool of a theory, is what the theory aims (inter alia) to account for. This is an important and difficult question, which underscores the motivations for adicity-diminishing principles, be they contextualist or relativist.

While it is beyond controversy that something, at some point, needs to be said on how semantic truth relates to truth *tout court*, so to speak, I would like to make two points. The first is that, however such bridging principles might go, they are going to be extra-semantic principles. This reinforces my claim that the contextualism-relativism debate does not bear on semantics proper, but rather, falls somewhere beyond. My second point is more important, even if it remains underdeveloped at this stage. I would like to suggest that the adicity-diminishing principles, relativist as well as contextualist, are questionable, and had better be dispensed with. Of course, to fully vindicate this point, I should have been able to provide an answer to the question of how semantic truth relates to other notions of truth – a question that I couldn't possibly hope to answer within the span of this paper. Instead, what I shall

do is offer some negative reasons that could lead one to doubt the well-foundedness of such extra-semantic principles, Kaplan's and MacFarlane's alike.

First things first, let me start with Kaplan's motivations. Kaplan's idea that the correct notion of sentence-truth-in-context is that of the sentence being true with respect to the context at stake *and at the circumstances determined by that very context* is one of those ideas that have been taken on board by Kaplan's followers without ever being questioned at all. However, once we look at this idea with some scrutiny, it becomes unclear what solid motivations could support it. Places at which Kaplan discusses the principle are scarce; here is one:

Since the content of an occurrence of a sentence containing indexicals depends on the context, the notion of *truth* must be relativized to a context. If c is a context, then an occurrence of ϕ in c is true iff the content expressed by ϕ in this context is true when evaluated with respect to the circumstances of the context. (...) If you try out the notion of truth on a few examples, you will see that it is correct. If I now utter a sentence, I will have uttered a truth just in case *what I said*, the content, is true in *these* circumstances.
(Kaplan 1989: 522-3)

The motivations that Kaplan offers here are shaky. The suggestion that we "try [it] on a few examples" shows that the endorsement of the principle relies heavily on intuitions. What is more, Kaplan is appealing to the notions of 'what is said' and of 'content' that, as we shall see soon, are equally shaky and intuition-driven.

All in all, Kaplan's adicity-diminishing principle, which reduces the many-place predicate of sentence truth (true with respect to a context, a world, a time, etc.) to the two-place predicate (true with respect to a context) has been introduced into the formal framework, and has become part of the Kaplanian heritage, without any solid arguments or evidence that would show it to be a correct principle.

Before moving on, let me briefly consider one important role that the principle has played in Kaplanian frameworks. The notion of truth thus obtained has been used in the definition of *logical* notions, such as that of *validity*. A sentence is thus LD-valid (i.e. valid in Kaplan's formal logic of indexicals) iff for all structures and assignments, and *for every context* c , the sentence is true in c (i.e. true when

evaluated with respect to c , w^c and t^c). A motivation for (and, at the same time, a consequence of) this definition was that the truth expressed by an utterance of the sentence "I am here now" would come out as a truth of logic. Kaplan considered the sentence at stake as "deeply, and somehow universally true" (1989: 509) and held that "one need only understand [its] meaning to know that it cannot be uttered falsely" (*ibid.*). But once more, the choice of defining *logical truth* as *truth in every context* turns out to rely on intuitions as to which sentences should come out as the truths of logic – intuitions that, to say the least, are controversial.⁷

To drive the point home, let me now state the three options under consideration. All of them share the same underlying *semantic* notion of truth, but differ as to the question of how that notion relates to various other notions of truth, including our intuitive, pre-theoretic notion(s). The first two options, already discussed, share the idea that there must be some non-trivial adicity-diminishing principle in order to bridge the gap between semantics and the rest, but diverge on the question of what that principle should be. Insofar as judge-dependence, and value-attributions more generally, are concerned, we get the following divide:

(CPS) "Contextualist" postsemantics:

$[[S]](c) = \text{True}^*$ iff for all assignments f , $[[S]](c, w^c, t^c, j^c) = \text{True}$;

(RPS) "Relativist" postsemantics:

$[[S]](c_U, c_A) = \text{True}^*$ iff for all assignments f , $[[S]](c_U, w^{c_U}, t^{c_U}, j^{c_A}, f) = \text{True}$,

The third option, which is the one that I favor, abstains from positing any such adicity-diminishing principle at all. Echoing Kaplan's own term (which he used for the analogous definition of validity), I shall speak of "neo-traditional postsemantics", or (NTPS) for short.

It does not take much effort to see that the three approaches may be inter-ranked in terms of their "predictive power", so to speak. RPS has more power in generating predictions than CPS does, because it allows, as a special case, that c_A ("the context of

⁷ The example of "I am here now" has generated a considerable literature, although most of it has focused on the question whether that particular case is or isn't a truth of logic, without reaching all the way down to the source of the problem. My own take on the question has been to argue that it is the notion itself of validity, rooted in the adicity-diminishing definition of sentence truth, that ought to be revised. Cf. Predelli and Stojanovic (2008) and Stojanovic (2012b).

assessment") be identical to c_U ("the context of utterance"). Thus everything that CPS can predict, RPS can predict it as well, but not vice versa. On the other hand, NTPS is, in the above sense, at least as powerful as RPS (and, by transitivity, more than CPS), given that every sequence of the relevant evaluation parameters, i.e. every (world, time, judge)-sequence, that may be supplied by c_U and c_A jointly,⁸ may be obviously directly supplied as such. Conversely, it may be argued that *in most cases* RPS has less predictive power than NTPS; however, the details of that argument will depend on the specific case under consideration. Thus, if we are only considering judgments of personal taste, in isolation from other value-attributions and other "assessment-sensitive" expressions (e.g. knowledge attributions or epistemic modals), the context of assessment's only purpose is to supply a value for the judge parameter, and RPS will have as much predictive power as NTPS. On the other hand, consider a natural extension of the framework to other types of assessment-sensitivity, resulting in a series of other parameters in the circumstances of evaluation, $s_1, s_2 \dots s_n$. We will then get:

(ERPS) Extended relativist postsemantics:

$$[[S]] (c_U, c_A) = \text{True}^* \text{ iff } \text{ for all assignments } f,$$

$$[[S]] (c_U, w^{cu}, t^{cu}, j^{ca}, s_1^{ca}, s_2^{ca} \dots s_n^{ca}, f) = \text{True}.$$

Whether (ERPS) will have as much predictive power as (NTPS) will crucially depend on how exactly the contexts of assessments are understood and modeled. If for every possible combination of values for the parameters that get determined by the context of assessment, there is a corresponding "context of assessment", then it will have the required flexibility to cover the range of predictions that NTPS covers; otherwise it won't.

Let me take stock. In the previous two sections, I tried to explain a different way of drawing the contextualism-relativism divide. I started from MacFarlane's move from temporalism to a different form of relativism, viz. one that relies on the idea of assessing truth from a context different from the one in which truth is expressed, then I looked at how the proposal extends to value-attributions. One of the crucial points was to observe that contexts of assessment, that new parameter introduced by MacFarlane, had no bearing upon the semantic machinery, but only popped up at

⁸ Remember that the world and the time being are supplied by c_U , and the judge, by c_A .

the stage of "postsemantics", through an adicity-diminishing principle. Relatedly, the line of demarcation between contextualist and relativist frameworks, as now drawn, did not show up in semantics either, but, once again, in postsemantics. My second crucial point was to emphasize that the adicity-diminishing principle that Kaplan proposed was not to be considered as a building block of the semantic framework itself, but, once again, was added to the framework over and above, in an attempt of using the many-place semantic predicate of truth to define a two-place predicate (holding between sentences and contexts), which was then used in the definition of *logical* truth. My double goal was to emphasize that the principle was not motivated by any semantic considerations and that the motivations for it were questionable.

By way of closing this section, it is worthwhile to look back, albeit briefly, at the case of future contingents, with which we begun. Wasn't MacFarlane's point to show that time-relativity, in the sense of having a time of evaluation parameter, won't do, and that an additional parameter, viz. a context of assessment, was required? Or so one might wonder. Admittedly, the time of evaluation is not enough – but what was neglected in that discussion was the fact that branching-time frameworks work with yet another parameter: the *history* of evaluation. The presence of that parameter paves the way to another account that gives justice to both of the initial desiderata, viz. lack of a truth value as of the time of utterance, truth as of the time after which the event has happened. Such an account has been given in Belnap & Green (1994). The idea is, basically, that the circumstances of evaluation contain, along with the time parameter, a history parameter, and that a future-tensed statement 'Will p' is true, as evaluated at moment t and history h, if there is t' later than t such that 'p' is true as evaluated at t' and h. If, at the time of utterance, we are unable to assign any truth value to the statement expressing a future contingent, that is because there are many histories that are still open, some on which the event happens, other on which it doesn't. On the other hand, once the event has happened, we are inclined to retrospectively evaluate the future contingent as true because, though there are still many histories that are open, they all coincide on the fact that the event at stake has happened, so that it no longer matters which among those histories will serve as a value for the history parameter in evaluating the statement for its truth value.

Given that the present topic are not future contingents, but value-attributions, I shall not pursue the details of Belnap and Green's account any further, nor compare MacFarlane's account to theirs. But one observation that I'd like to make is that the issue is tightly connected with adicity-diminishing principles, which occupied us

this section. Namely, the Belnap–Green account is precisely one that refrains from positing any such principles, or adding a layer of "postsemantics" over and above the semantic machinery. If we were to map our tripartite distinction among various postsemantics – contextualist (CPS) vs. relativist (RPS) vs. neo-traditional (NTPS) – to the debate on future contingents, then the question is, what determines the value of the history parameter. Contextualism would say that it is the context in which the sentence is used;⁹ relativism would say that it is the context of assessment; and the neo-traditional account, under which I would classify Belnap and Green's account, would say that the question itself is ill-conceived. The very nature of time and of the contingency of the future leaves infinitely many histories open, and to ask what is "the" history at which to evaluate a future contingent makes little sense. Yet, this fact does not prevent us from being able to use, and assert, sentences whose truth values depend, *inter alia*, on the history parameter. While semantics leaves the specification of the history parameter entirely open, various pragmatic factors may come into play when we consider the role of future-tensed statements, say, in assertion, belief, or agency. And this can be done without positing any firm "bridging principles".¹⁰

V It's all about Content

So far, we have seen two ways of describing the contextualism–relativism divide. The first one was concerned with the semantic (and, to some extent, syntactic) analysis of the variability in truth value that value-attributions exhibit; the second one was concerned with "postsemantics" and the definition(s) of the truth predicate(s). I have argued that in both cases, the divide has been overestimated, and that relativism, whether semantic or postsemantic, is not extraordinarily innovative. In the previous section, we also saw that Kaplan's followers took on as part of the whole "package deal" certain assumptions, like the adicity-diminishing principle concerning the truth predicate, or the corresponding definition of logical truth; assumptions that, as

9 In the debate on future contingents, the "Thin Red Line" account could perhaps be seen as a form of contextualism, to the extent that at the time of utterance, the "actual" history has already been fixed.

10 Here is a quote that, despite from being taken out of context, may still prove helpful: "On the present account of assertion, it makes sense to talk of asserting *"Will:(the coin lands heads)"* exactly because assertion constitutes a way of closing the history parameter — not indeed semantically (the semantics of the asserted sentence is unchanged), but pragmatically, by the very act of assertion." (Belnap and Green 1994/2001): 174.

I argued, are unwarranted and under-motivated.¹¹ Another such unwarranted piece of the Kaplanian heritage is the of *content*, which Kaplan further identified with *what is said*. Here is a typical passage:

The content of an expression is always taken *with respect to* a given context of use. Thus when I say "I was insulted yesterday" a specific content – *what is said* – is expressed. Your utterance of the same sentence, or mine on another day, would not express the same content. (Kaplan 1979: 83)

Even though the notion of content, and specifically the equation "content = *what is said*", were not met with unanimous approval (even among Kaplan's followers), it is surprising to see what a central place considerations about what is said occupy in the ongoing contextualism-relativism debate. One frequently finds contextualism described (by relativists) as a certain view regarding an expression's contribution to what is said, as may be seen from these the following passages:

The contextualist takes the subjectivity of a discourse to consist in the fact that it is covertly about the speaker (or a larger group picked out by the speaker's context and intentions). Thus, in saying that apples are "delicious", the speaker says, in effect, that apples taste good to her (or to those in her group). (MacFarlane 2007)

On this view, 'It's wrong to cheat' involves ellipsis, or a place holder indicating a set of standards, a code, whatever. What [its] use says depends on what has been elided or what is being assigned to the place holder. (Richard 2008)

¹¹ The metaphor of a package deal comes from Lewis (1980), who famously wrote: "I see Stalnaker and Kaplan as putting forth package deals" (p. 42). Lewis further writes: "Part of each package is a preference, which I oppose as unwarranted and arbitrary, for variable but simple semantic values" (ibid.), where by the latter he means contextually determined semantic contents. In this respect, the points that I am about to make, to the effect that the Kaplanian notion of content is unwarranted, was already there in Lewis' discussion, to which I owe a lot.

Both MacFarlane and Richard, in describing the rival contextualist views, place a lot of weight on the idea that contextualism is a view about what the speaker *says*.

In fairness to MacFarlane and Richard, it may be acknowledged that *in certain debates*, 'contextualist' views *are* views about what is said.¹² Nevertheless, it is also true that, in arguing against contextualism, some of the relativists' arguments seem to rest on equivocation. For, relativism has been put forward as an alternative to the more traditional *semantic* frameworks, and the latter were argued to be incapable of allowing for a correct treatment of predicates of taste, value-attributions, and so on. But clearly, contextualism understood as merely a proposal about the features of our semantic framework is *not* a view about *what is said*. The formal framework of Kaplan (1989), as such, is one in which, to be sure, one can *define* a notion of 'content' (or 'what is said') the way Kaplan does, but *not* one of which such a notion is constitutive. The notion of content comes over and above the semantic framework itself. It is thus perfectly consistent to accept a "contextualist" formal semantics, such as that in Kaplan (1989) or, for that matter, any double-indexed semantics, without being "contextualist" in the sense of taking the contextually supplied elements to be part of *what is said*.

A similar misconception concerns the notion of 'content' (even when the latter is not identified with 'what is said'). Thus for instance, by way of a reply to my semantic equivalence results, rehearsed in sect. I, Lasersohn writes:

But really, this proof establishes intertranslatability only in a relatively broad sense. This becomes apparent as soon as one notices that Stojanovic nowhere gives an explicit definition of semantic content, or an explanation of how content relates to context. If, following Kaplan, we assume that the values of pronouns are fixed as part of the assignment of contents to expressions in context [...] the translation function will not respect sameness and difference of semantic content. [...] Showing that two sentences have the same distribution of truth values across a set of models or indices does not show that they are equivalent in content,

12 That would be, for instance, if not the most accurate then at least not an inaccurate description of contextualism in the sense of Recanati (2004). As for the different meanings that the term 'contextualism' receives in the different debates, see the discussion in Stojanovic (2008b).

if the mapping from indices to truth values proceeds Kaplan-style in two steps, and content is defined with reference to the level between the steps. Since the debate between relativism and contextualism turns partly on the issue of which parameters get fixed in which step, we cannot ignore this issue in comparing the two approaches. I conclude that the use of non-standard indices is not semantically equivalent to the use of implicit pronoun arguments without such indices. (2008: 319–20)

If the Kaplanian notion of content should turn out to be a semantic notion, and if the debate between relativism and contextualism should indeed (even if only partly) be a debate about what goes into the content and what doesn't, then Lasersohn's conclusion would be justified. However, the antecedents in both conditionals heavily rely on a notion that is far from being uncontroversial. Or rather, insofar as it is a technical notion, defining 'contents' as mappings from circumstances of evaluation (or 'indices') to truth values, the notion *is* clear enough. But then, in order for the debate to make sense, we would need to be able to compare and evaluate the two approaches by relating the technical notion of 'content' to some empirically testable predictions. Yet that final, crucial step remains as unclear as ever.

By way of conclusion, the overall discussion in this paper has been more critical than constructive. I started by rehearsing my previous results that show the implicit argument approaches to be equivalent (when suitably construed) to the "relativist" approaches *à la* Lasersohn and Kölbel, which introduce a novel parameter in the circumstances of evaluation to account for variations in truth value associated with predicates of personal taste and, more generally, with value-attributions. Admittedly, matters are more complicated, to the extent that there is no consensus as to what the divide between contextualism and relativism precisely amounts to. That has led me to look at another construal of the divide, the one that has emerged from the work of John MacFarlane. On that construal, the relevant question is that of deciding how to fix the values of the appropriate parameters to which truth – or, at least, the notion of truth with which semantics operates – is relative. Contextualism thus understood says that the context of utterance fixes those values, and relativism, that the context of assessment does that job. My own take on this choice is to reject the very idea that we ought to choose. Both answers bring along unwelcome consequences, and rest on

adicity-diminishing principles for which not enough motivation has been provided.

To be sure, the observation, made by Kölbel and others, that there had better be some way of relating the semantic many-place predicate of truth to the notion(s) of truth that are relevant to other philosophical enterprises, such as theory of assertion, belief, knowledge, agency, and the like, remains a valid observation. Nevertheless, my point is that the adicity-diminishing principles proposed by contextualists or relativists alike are not sufficient to bridge the gap. We saw that Kaplan's motivations for the principle boil down to the idea that if we "try out the notion of truth on a few examples, [we] will see that it is correct". But precisely, value-attributions and other phenomena of their ilk do not seem to show the principle to be correct. On the other hand, MacFarlane's attempt to fix the principle might well turn out to offer some improvement over the old principle. However, it, too, falls short of bridging the gap between semantics and the other areas mentioned (assertion, belief, knowledge, etc.); witness the fact that when it comes to applying the resulting notion of relative truth to those other areas, one can observe MacFarlane go through immense struggle to bridge the remaining gap (cf. e.g. MacFarlane (2005) or (2012, Ch. 5)). My own suggestion, albeit programmatic, is that it might be best not to stipulate any adicity-diminishing principles at all. Of course, if such a view is to be seen as a competitor to the views that endorse some adicity-diminishing principle, be it contextualist or relativist, I would need to flesh out in greater detail how semantics would connect with an account of assertion, belief, etc., without transiting through "postsemantics". Let me leave that as a prospect for future research.¹³ For the time being, I hope to have achieved the more modest goal of having shown that our semantic machinery, and the corresponding notion of truth, do not by themselves require that there be any further adicity-diminishing principles. Hence, if the contextualism-relativism divide is shaped upon the choice between Kaplanian vs. MacFarlanian postsemantics, then it may well turn out to be a barren debate, should it turn out that, as I contend, no specific adicity-diminishing principles are required.

Finally, in this last section, I have considered the contextualism-relativism divide as shaped upon the choice of what one puts into what is said, and/or into semantic content, and what one decides to leave out. Once again, if my proposal is to be taken as a competitor, I would need to say more on how semantics connects with assertion

¹³ In the case of future contingents, as already mentioned, a proposal that does not posit any adicity-diminishing yet manages to address successfully the relationship between semantics and assertion would be, for instance, the one advanced in Belnap and Green (1994).

and other areas in which the notion of content has been seen as useful. Note, though, that in this respect, most among the relativist proposals do not provide a full-fledged account of 'what is said'. Conversely, I have made attempts elsewhere to flesh out in some detail the alternative account of semantic content, which rejects the Kaplanian assumption that indexicals (and, for that matter, other context-sensitive expressions) contribute contextually determined elements to content/what is said (cf. Stojanovic (2008a), (2009)). For present purposes, the important point, already anticipated in Lewis (1980), is that such assumptions about content and what is said do not come from the semantics itself, but must be built on the top of it, as it were. Hence, once again, if contextualism is to be distinguished from relativism in terms of such extra-semantic assumptions, it may well turn out to be a barren debate, given that the underlying assumptions about what is said and content presupposed in the debate are already highly questionable.

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